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On May 31, 2005, the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision overturned the conviction 
of accounting firm Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”) on the charge of “corruptly 
persuad[ing]”1 persons to withhold documents from an official proceeding.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in this case is “a bit like being acquitted years after the guillotine.”2 The 
firm had largely been destroyed by the defection of many large publicly held clients 
before the conviction.  Many of the firm’s 88,000 employees, most of whom never dealt 
with the Enron account, were at other jobs or on the unemployment rolls by the time the 
conviction was handed down.   As one former Andersen employee noted in an interview, 
“It was the indictment that killed Andersen, not the conviction.”3 The overruling of the 
conviction is not going to bring Andersen back.   
 In this case, the indictment alone was a death sentence; the partnership was 
largely destroyed before it had an opportunity to present evidence in court or, for that 
matter, before the government had to prove its case.  While many clients remained loyal 
as the Enron/Andersen story broke, the biggest clients, the publicly held corporations, felt 
they could no longer stay with an impugned Andersen following the Department of 
Justice’s indictment.  Thus, a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule along 
with the agency’s and the Justice Department’s unwillingness to compromise in this 
particular case trumped the tenet of innocent until proven guilty. 
 The Andersen case has been and will continue to be analyzed by many 
commentators for years to come.  Many have analyzed the situation within Andersen that 
led to the erosion of its public trust and its declining standards.4 Others have analyzed in 
depth why the firm should be found guilty.5 Still others have looked how the Andersen 
2case and the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act affect document retention and destruction 
policies.6 The Andersen case has also been analyzed for its construction of the federal 
witness tampering statute.7
The aim of this article is to examine the impact an indictment can have against a 
limited liability partnership of professionals for the actions of a few in the court of public 
opinion, and the power of the government to destroy a large, well-known business with 
many employees who had no connection to the crime or the Enron account.8 The 
overturning of the conviction, in this case, is not an exoneration and the firm could have 
been retried and found guilty.   On November 25, 2005, the Friday after Thanksgiving, 
the Justice Department quietly announced in a press release that it would abandon its 
prosecution of Andersen.9
The article begins with a brief chronological description of the factual background 
of the case.  It then examines the weight an indictment is supposed to have, followed by 
the standards for issuing an indictment against an entire partnership rather than just the 
individuals who allegedly performed wrongful acts.  The notion of prosecutorial 
discretion is heavily emphasized, and the factors that contributed to the prosecution of 
Andersen are discussed.  Finally, the implications of this situation are discussed in detail, 
as they extend beyond Enron and Andersen and are not limited by the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  While the particulars of this case suggest questionable 
motivations on the part of many of the participants, the intent of this article is to show the 
considerable power government prosecutors may exert over certain business 
organizations, even absent such motives.  In short, the United States government has the 
power to destroy a partnership, such as an accounting or law firm, without the burden of 
trial or having to provide evidence of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3Case Background 
 By now, the background of the Andersen case is familiar to many.  Andersen 
served as the “independent auditor” for Enron, a global energy markets trader.  At one 
time, Enron was the seventh largest company in the United States.10 Andersen earned 
fees from the Enron account averaging about $1 million dollars per week.11 Andersen 
had already run afoul of the SEC rules on several occasions, including involvement in 
fraud cases at Waste Management and Sunbeam, and settling for $217 million a case 
involving the Baptist Foundation of Arizona.12 Andersen was also the auditor for Global 
Crossing and WorldCom,13 both of which followed Enron as heavily publicized corporate 
fraud cases at the early turn of the century.     
 The nation was still reeling from the attacks of September 11th when on October 
16, 2001, Enron in a press release announced a $618 million net loss for the third quarter.  
It also announced it would reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion.  The value of Enron 
stock, already on the decline, quickly tumbled.  The next day, the SEC informed Enron of 
its formal inquiry into the case.  Enron, in turn, informed its Andersen audit team two 
days later.  On October 20, a conference call among Andersen partners concluded that the 
auditors should gather documentation related to Enron to assist the SEC investigation.14 
Allegedly, on October 23, Andersen began destroying documents in Houston, per 
the lead Enron partner David Duncan’s insistence in following the firm’s document 
retention policy.  Andersen received a subpoena for Enron-related documents on 
November 8.  Duncan, through his secretary, sent an email on November 9 urging 
employees to stop shredding.15 Andersen reported the document destruction to the SEC 
and the Justice Department on January 4, 2002.   
4What followed was a flurry of legal and public relations maneuvering.  According 
to Kurt Eichenwald in the New York Times, prior to the indictment, the SEC wanted to 
settle with Andersen for $500 million.  Andersen refused, largely because of a number of 
class-action lawsuits filed in the wake of Enron, leaving the firm potentially liable for 
another $750 million or more.  Andersen reportedly was interested in settling for at least 
$150 million less.16 
The firm also tried to sway the public to rally to its cause.  Full-page ads appeared 
in the Wall Street Journal and other major papers, urging that Enron and a few rogue 
employees, not the entire firm, were to blame.  The firm hired former Federal Reserve 
chairman Paul Volcker to recommend changes to the firm and to help in negotiations 
with the federal government.  Andersen employees rallied in the streets, wearing bright 
orange T-shirts that read “I Am Arthur Andersen.”   
 Despite the public relations appeals and legal negotiations, Andersen was indicted 
on March 14, 2002 on a single count of obstructing justice.17 The Justice Department 
used the indictment hoping Andersen would settle quickly.18 Andersen, however, was 
concerned that pleading guilty would cause state authorities across the country to remove 
its licenses.  Instead, Andersen proceeded to trial, pushing to get the case through as 
quickly as possible to try to exonerate itself.19 
Andersen was tried in the Southern District of Texas on one count of violating 18 
U.S.C.  § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B): 
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in 
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to ... cause or 
induce any person to ... withhold testimony, or withhold a record, 
document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy, 
mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding ... shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.  
5(emphasis added).  The jury deliberated for seven days, coming back deadlocked.  Judge 
Harmon issued an Allen charge, in which the jury returns for further instructions, and the 
judge informs them of their duty to decide the case, and that they should listen to each 
other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced.20 Three days later, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict. The court denied Andersen's motion for a judgment of acquittal.  
Andersen appealed.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding the jury instructions proper.21 
At issue in the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court appeals was what the statute 
meant to "knowingly ... corruptly persuad[e]" someone.  The government argued that 
“knowingly” did not modify the phrase “corruptly persuades,” thus negating the intent 
requirement.  The prosecution convinced  Judge Harmon to issue instructions to the jury 
that “dishonesty” was not required to find Andersen guilty, but rather that the firm merely  
impeded the prosecutor's fact-finding.22 In other words, under the government’s 
argument, no intent to obstruct was necessary; the facts that documents were shredded 
and that the absence of the documents would impede the prosecutor were sufficient for a 
guilty verdict. 
 The Supreme Court held these instructions improper.  Following United States v. 
Aguilar23, the Court held that the statute required a “nexus” between the obstruction and a 
proceeding.  In other words, the defendant must know that his actions are likely to affect 
the proceeding.   Because the jury instructions failed to properly define this nexus 
requirement, the conviction was overturned.   
 The conviction itself and the subsequent appeals were meaningless with regard to 
the firm's survival.  As an Andersen spokesman stated after the Supreme Court decision, 
“we pursued an appeal of this case not because we believe Arthur Andersen could be 
restored to its previous position but because we had an obligation to set the record 
6straight and to clear the good name of the 28,000 innocent people who lost their jobs at 
the time of the indictment.” 24 As this statement indicates, the indictment itself was the 
death of the firm.  As with the instructions issued to the jury in its trial, the government 
did not have to establish guilt to wipe out one of the largest accounting firms in the 
nation.  It issued the indictment, and that was enough.   
The Legal Standard for an Indictment and its Authority 
 An indictment is “the formal written accusation of a crime, made by a grand jury 
and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person.”25 An indictment, in 
other words, is simply an indication by a grand jury that there is sufficient evidence to go 
forward with a trial.  The standard for an indictment is considerably lower than that for a 
conviction.  While the standard for a criminal conviction is guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, 26 the standard for a grand jury to return an indictment is that the person charged is 
probably guilty27 or that there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty.28 
Significantly, grand jury proceedings are not governed by the rules of evidence.29 
Thus, for example, it is possible to issue an indictment on the basis of hearsay which 
would not be admissible during the trial.30 In Costello v. United States, for example, the 
defendant was indicted for income tax evasion.  He filed a motion to examine the minutes 
of the grand jury and found that the indictment was entirely based on the testimony of 
three government agents who had no firsthand knowledge of the transactions in question.  
The Supreme Court said that the Constitution required grand juries for the issuance of 
indictments.  However, the Constitution made no mention of how grand juries should 
proceed.  Historically, grand juries were made up of laypersons and grand juries 
historically could even act upon their own personal knowledge.  Thus, to force the rules 
of evidence upon grand jury proceedings, the Court held, “would run counter to the 
7whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries 
unfettered by technical rules."31 
Further, indictments cannot be challenged because they are not supported by the 
adequate evidence.32 Courts usually will not review the sufficiency of the evidence 
before the grand jury.33 This is especially true if there is at least some34 legal and 
competent35 evidence in support of the indictment was before the grand jury.  Such 
evidence need not necessarily involve every element of the criminal charge.  Instead, 
there must be some evidence relative to the charge.36   In fact, a single witness's testimony 
before a grand jury can be sufficient for an indictment.37 
Thus, an indictment is not meant to have the force of a conviction.  In turn, it is 
much easier for prosecutors to obtain.  In the United States, our criminal law is premised 
on the fundamental notion of the defendant being innocent until proven guilty.38 While 
an indictment does have some force and may be an indication of guilt, it is not a 
conviction and is not meant to have the same impact.   An indictment confirms neither 
guilt nor innocence.  It is simply the first step in a complex legal process. 
Factors That Led to the Death of Andersen  
Charging a Partnership with Criminal Activity for the Actions of a Few 
 Like a corporation, a partnership can be held criminally liable for the actions of its 
agents.  The Supreme Court determined this in the case of United States v. A&P 
Trucking Co.39 There, two partnerships were charged with violations of certain 
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.  The district court had found that the 
partnerships as entities could not be charged with violating the statutes.  The Supreme 
Court, however, reversed, looking at the definition of “person” found in 1 U.S.C. § 1:  “in 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . 
8. . the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock corporations as well as individuals” 
(emphasis added).  The Court looked at Congressional intent in the statute, finding that 
the intent to bar the activity in question was not limited by the form of the organization.40 
Many carriers are organized as partnerships and the form of the organization should not 
trump the intent of the statute.41 
While under common law, the Court noted, partnerships could not be charged 
with a crime, Congress had the power to change this rule.  A business cannot be allowed 
to commit a crime simply because of its form of organization or because the partners “do 
not personally participate in the infraction.”42 The Court made clear that charging the 
partnership should not punish those partners and others that were not involved in the 
criminal act:  “The corollary is, of course, that the conviction of a partnership cannot be 
used to punish the individual partners, who might be completely free of personal guilt.  
As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can lead only to a fine levied 
on the firm’s assets.”43 
Commentators have noted that prosecutions of partnerships, particularly 
professional partnerships such as law and accounting firms, are rare; prosecutors 
generally prefer to go after the individual partners involved in the criminal activity.44 
Certain similarities exist in cases in which corporations and partnerships are held 
criminally liable.  Typically these similarities are:  partners and associates are involved, 
acting within the scope of their authority; the entity benefited from the violations, and 
there is a perceived need to prosecute the entire entity so that others will abide by the 
law.45 
9In Andersen’s case, these factors were present.  David Duncan, the lead Enron 
partner, plead guilty to obstructing justice.  Other partners, although not all of them, were 
involved.  All the partners, however, share in the profits of the firm, and Enron was one 
of Andersen’s biggest and most profitable clients, bringing in about $57 million annually 
in fees.46 Further, as discussed in more detail below, there was a perceived need on 
behalf of the administration to punish Andersen as major corporate scandals erupted.    
The Supreme Court’s concerns about the prosecution of innocent partners and 
employees in A&P Trucking went unheeded in the Andersen case.  Many who were not 
involved were harmed by the prosecution of Andersen.  Many non-partners lost their 
jobs.  Retired Andersen partners lost their savings as their interests in the firm became 
worthless, much as Enron shareholders and employees found their savings decimated by 
the stock’s rapid decline.   The destruction of one business caused the government to 
destroy another, putting more people out of work in a tough economy and wiping out the 
retirements of more.   
Prosecutorial Discretion 
 The question of whether to prosecute an entire organization, then, is one of 
prosecutorial discretion dependent on the particular facts of the case.  The Justice 
Department could choose to prosecute the individuals directly involved with or without 
prosecuting the entire partnership.  Andersen knew this and, as discussed above, there 
was much legal wrangling, public and private, prior to the indictment.  Many factors here, 
some appropriate, some questionable, likely contributed to the decision to prosecute the 
entire firm.   
 Publicly, the Justice Department stated two reasons to warrant the prosecution of 
the entire firm rather than just the individuals involved.  First, it said, the shredding of the 
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documents warranted the rare action of indicting the entire firm, even as the lead Enron 
partner had already plead guilty.   The government never charged Andersen with any 
wrongdoing regarding the audits themselves.47 
Second, at the time of the Enron debacle, Andersen as a firm had already been in 
trouble with authorities.  The Waste Management case resulted in a court injunction 
against the firm.  The firm was barred from future misdeeds.   No doubt the firm's 
involvement with Waste Management and other prior SEC cases contributed to the 
prosecutor's sense that Andersen was a firm that needed to be reprimanded and reformed.  
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff reportedly was unmoved by notions that an 
indictment would destroy Andersen, describing the firm as a “recidivist” that deserved 
the harshest punishment.48 This image of Andersen as a “recidivist” played a major role 
in the subsequent trial.  The trial court allowed admission of evidence of Andersen’s prior 
bad acts with regards to its work on the Sunbeam and Waste Management accounts, and 
the Fifth Circuit upheld this admission.49 
Other unnamed factors also likely contributed to the Justice Department’s 
decision to prosecute the entire firm rather than just the individual wrongdoers.  Among 
these are intense media coverage, the magnitude of the Enron case, and political 
considerations throughout the Bush administration and the Justice Department.   
Media Coverage 
 Today, the news media is global and far-reaching.  The stock market boom of the 
1990’s promoted wide coverage of business and corporate dealings, and CEO’s became 
famous.  When the bubble burst, many people lost considerable sums of money, but 
continued to follow the market and corporate news, largely as their retirement accounts 
and mutual funds were tied up in the stock market.  When Enron collapsed amidst a slew 
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of large corporate scandals, the news media were quick to cover the story.  Andersen, as 
the corporation’s auditor, was heavily scrutinized.   
The Magnitude of the Enron Case 
Federal prosecutors clearly considered the magnitude of the Enron debacle. Enron 
was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history.50 While negotiating with Andersen, 
Chertoff called the situation “the worst case of corporate obstruction I have ever seen.”51 
Many found their retirement savings decimated.  Today the word “Enron” has become 
synonymous with corporate greed and scandal.  “Andersen,” through its relationship with 
Enron, has become synonymous for accounting improprieties and failure to protect 
shareholders through corporate audits.   
Political Considerations 
Politics, too, likely played a role.  The fall of Enron came on the heels of the 
September 11 attacks, in which the government looked ineffective in protecting the 
populace.  It also emerged from Texas, where the new President had been governor.   
Ken Lay, Enron's CEO, was close friends with the Bush family and his company had 
close affiliations with Halliburton, an energy company Vice President Cheney formerly 
headed.52 Prior to September 11 and the collapse of Enron, President Bush's domestic 
policy floundered.  Enron and Andersen both were major contributors to the Bush 
campaign.53 All these factors forced the Justice Department and the Bush administration 
to prosecute Andersen sternly to appear effective against corporate greed. 
Political considerations influenced not only the top of the administration.  At the 
Justice Department, Michael Chertoff was the prosecutor who chose to indict Andersen.  
Such a high-profile case garnered political notice.  He is currently secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security.  The Supreme Court’s decision is unlikely to affect 
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Chertoff in his current career.  His decision to prosecute the entire firm and his 
succession in gaining a conviction in the district court likely contributed to the 
advancement of his career.   The subsequent overturning of the conviction is unlikely to 
affect his current placement.   
As of this writing, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling's trials are slated for January 2006, 
almost five years after Enron's collapse and four years after Andersen's.  Clearly, the pro-
business administration wanted to prosecute someone in the wake of the Enron disaster to 
look effective against illegal corporate greed and fraud.  While prosecutions of the 
higher-ups in Enron were inevitable, the administration instead chose to pursue its 
accountants first.  An argument can be made that the case against the top Enron 
executives is tougher and takes longer to put together.  The shredding, on the other hand, 
was an easily identifiable impropriety.   
Nonetheless, any questionable accounting methods began at Enron.  Andersen 
may have signed off on the improper accounting, persuaded to do so by the large fees 
paid by Enron and its desire to placate a profitable client.  Significantly, Andersen has 
never been charged with impropriety regarding its audit of Enron; its sole criminal charge 
amounted to destroying documents related to the account.54 
The individuals who gained the most from the fraudulent scheme were the top 
Enron executives, not the outside accountants and auditors.  Prosecuting Andersen 
garnered front-page headlines, making the Justice Department look as though it were 
doing something about corporate greed and malfeasance.  Andersen may be to blame, but 
its crime was merely that of aiding and abetting, not the actual theft.   
SEC Rule 102(e)  
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The indictment opened up the possibility of conviction.  Conviction would be 
devastating enough, but in this case it was exacerbated by the presence of SEC Rule 
102(e).  Under this rule, certain people can be barred from practice before the SEC; thus, 
they cannot represent publicly held companies.  At the time of the indictment, Andersen 
served as auditor for 20 percent of the country's publicly held companies.55 Among those 
the SEC can bar are “any person who has been convicted of a felony.”56 The disbarment 
or suspension is “deemed to have occurred when the disbarring, suspending, revoking or 
convicting agency or tribunal enters its judgment or order.”57 In other words, an 
indictment should be insufficient to bar a firm from representing SEC clients.   
 The SEC also provides waivers allowing those who might be barred from 
practicing with SEC approval.  In Andersen’s case, during settlement negotiations, the 
SEC gave no assurances that Andersen would receive a waiver if it were convicted.  The 
SEC did promulgate regulations designed to forestall panic should Andersen collapse.  
These regulations allowed SEC registrants to continue to use previous Andersen reports 
without certain technical requirements, such as a signature, since the firm was unlikely to 
continue existence.58 Thus, the SEC assumed Andersen would collapse even before its 
conviction.  This pessimism contributed to a sense of Andersen's demise as a foregone 
conclusion and furthered the decline of the firm and the defection of major clients.   
Reputation and Timing 
At one time, Andersen was the most venerated accounting firm.  Over the years, 
however, a series of scandals and poor judgments led the firm to lose much of its 
reputation.  Given this history, Andersen knew an indictment would be problematic, if 
not devastating.  Hence, as discussed above, it tried in vain to negotiate deals with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Justice Department to avoid it.  
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Andersen knew an indictment would be extremely troublesome to the firm in an industry 
where integrity and honest dealing are considered sacrosanct.   
Prosecutors knew this.  They also knew something of the accounting industry.  
The first criminal charge ever leveled against a major accounting firm came at the height 
of the season when publicly traded companies ask shareholders to approve their choice of 
auditor.59 It is safe to assume that the management of no company wanted to go to its 
shareholders to approve an indicted accounting firm.  Thus, even though the firm had yet 
to be convicted and this country's criminal laws are premised on the notion of innocent 
until proven guilty, the indictment was sufficient to make the clients leave.  They left in 
droves, each day the departure of a major client or two would be headline news.  These 
defections snowballed; as more companies left, other companies grew less confident in 
Andersen and left themselves.   
While the defections were highly visible, Andersen could not actively recruit new 
clients to replace its losses at the time.  No company would want to move from another 
major firm to Andersen.  Further, the U.S. Government banned Andersen from bidding 
on federal contracts.60 Andersen was losing clients and could not make up the losses.   
Conclusion 
 Many would like to call the Enron case unique.  However, cases like Worldcom 
and Global Crossing indicate wide-scale corporate fraud is not.  Further, the case of 
Andersen is not a unique one.  In a study, Theodore Eisenberg and Jonathan Macey show 
that Andersen was not a unique case among large accounting firms.61 Their study shows 
that Andersen's performance with regard to financial statements was not statistically 
different from the other large accounting firms.   
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The Sarbones-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the Enron/Andersen scandal, is 
designed to address some of these problems.  However, problems of auditor 
independence are still relevant.  The ramifications of the Andersen case are highlighted 
again by current events.  The Justice Department recently contemplated criminal charges 
against one of the remaining large accounting firms, KPMG, related to its use of illegal 
tax shelters.62 Before KPMG settled and many of the individuals involved were 
arrested,63 the SEC contemplated whether to grant a waiver should KPMG be convicted 
and promulgating rules to assure large companies if KPMG collapses.64 If  KPMG or 
another major accounting firm were to collapse as Andersen did, the further consolidation 
and concentration of the large accounting firms into three is likely to spur other problems.   
 As the Andersen and KPMG cases show, prosecutorial discretion is a major factor 
these days in determining whether a firm can survive.  While a firm may have acted 
improperly, it can negotiate with prosecutors, paying remuneration or fines rather than 
going through the publicity and expense of trial.  An indictment is devastating for a firm 
that relies on a strong public image of honesty and integrity.  Prosecutors know this, and 
can exploit their power over firms.  An indictment takes only a little evidence to get, but 
can have an enormous impact.   
 As the decision to prosecute KPMG is considered, the question of the value of 
prosecuting a company must be considered.   As one commentator has pointed out, a 
prosecution and conviction of KPMG would not harm it because “it has no soul” and the 
costs would be paid by partners, employees and customers.65 Punishing a corporation 
persecutes individuals who were not involved in the wrongdoing.  There is rarely 
opposition to corporate punishment because a corporation is seen as a soulless entity and 
without individual suffering since the costs are spread among many.66 
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Writing in the New York Times, Stanford law professor and former commissioner 
of the SEC Joseph Grundfest comments persuasively that “[b]ecause the only sure 
defense is not to attract the prosecutor’s attention in the first instance, the rise of 
prosecutorial power may be society’s strongest tool to enforce corporate integrity.”67 
Grundfest points out that many large corporations and partnerships could be destroyed 
simply by the government issuing criminal charges against them.  Any firm or 
organization that requires a strong public reputation is at risk as is any organization that 
does business with the federal government.  The power of the government over these 
firms, demonstrated by its destruction of Andersen, is potentially crippling.   
 There are other ramifications from Grundfest’s statement.  If the goal is to avoid 
prosecutorial attention, wrongdoers may just hide their misdeeds in more complex 
transactions and cover-ups.  Alternatively, wrongdoers may work even harder to 
ingratiate themselves into the political system so that prosecutors feel pressure from 
higher-ups and politicians to look the other way.   
 Grundfest argues that, in the Andersen trial, “prosecutors persuaded the trial judge 
to interpret the law in a way that eviscerated the government's need to prove Andersen's 
criminal intent.”68 This is symptomatic of the whole system at play.  The prosecutors did 
not have to prove their case.  They punished Andersen prior to a guilty verdict.  They put 
thousands of people who had never dealt with Enron out of work.  Enron wiped out 
numerous 401(k)'s; the government wiped out the investments of retired Andersen 
partners who had invested in the firm over many years.   
 Grundfest questions whether stronger safeguards against prosecutors who can 
“exercise their life or death power over corporations”69 can even be put in place, whether 
they come from Congress, the Justice Department, the SEC or the press.  This leads to a 
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vicious cycle of watchdogs watching watchdogs.  If prosecutors are conscientious and 
make balanced informed decisions about whether to prosecute cases, the problem 
manages itself.  When, however, prosecutors are persuaded by politics, personal 
ambition, and the spotlight of a high profile case, even innocent organizations are in 
jeopardy.   
 The Andersen case highlights a contemporary problem in American law.  As 
media coverage is instantaneous and omnipresent, the ramifications of the issuance of an 
indictment can be damning, despite the possibility of acquittal or reversal of a conviction.  
Prosecutors need not be overreaching, overzealous or politically motivated to destroy a 
major partnership or corporation and put thousands out of work.  Prosecutors must be 
careful and discriminating in wielding the awesome power of their ability to seek and 
obtain indictments that are potentially lethal.   
 
1 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2000). 
 
2 Mark Coultan, Andersen Wins in Supreme Court, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 2, 2005. 
 
3 Kristen Hays, Ruling No Comfort for Ex-Andersen Workers, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005. 
 
4 Christine E. Earley, Kate Odabashian & Michael Willenborg, Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at 
Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1013 (2002-2003).   
 
5 Kathleen F. Buckley, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917 (2003). 
 
6 James Dabney Miller, Esq., The Andersen Decision and Document Management Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
19 ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REPORTER 2 (June 30, 2005). 
 
7 Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 18 
U.S.C.A. §1512(b), 185 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2003). 
 
8 I should say up front that I was one of the 88,000 Andersen employees put out of work by the indictment, 
although I never handled the Enron account. Nonetheless, this article is not intended as any sort of defense 
of the firm or anyone within it.   
9 Accounting:  Justice Department Abandons Prosecution of Arthur Andersen,
Daily Tax Report (Nov. 25, 2006). 
 
10 Anderson indictment, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.html 
 
18
11 Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital Markets:  
Evidence from the Fall of Enron, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (2003).   
 
12 Allan Sloan and Mark Hosenball, Andersen’s Demise Seems in the Cards, ST. PETERSBURG (RUSSIA)
TIMES , March 26, 2002. 
 
13 Id.
14 Buckley, supra note 5, at 920. 
15Duncan himself later plead guilty to witness tampering and testified for the prosecution against his former 
firm. 
 
16 Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands; The Investigation; S.E.C. Had Sought $500 Million in Failed 
Talks with Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2002.   
 
17 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). 
 
18 Sloan and Hosenball, supra note 11.    
 
19 Eichenwald, supra note 15.     
 
20Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).   
 
21 United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2004), overruled by 125 S. Ct. 
2129 (2005).   
 
22 Id.
23515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
 
24 Mark Coultan, Andersen Wins in Supreme Court, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 2, 2005. 
 
25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (8th edition 2004). 
 
26 Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 
27 Id.
28 United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 756 (D.C. Wash. 1925).   
 
29 United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102 (1987); Fed. Rules Evid. 1101(d)(2).   
 
30 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).   
 
31 Costello, 350 U.S. at 364. 
 
32 Id.. 
 
33 Murdick v. United States, 15 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1926). 
 
34 Greenberg v. Superior Court for City and County of San Francisco, 121 P.2d 713, 715 (Cal. 1942), 
Howard v. State, 137 So. 532, 534 (Ala. App. 1931). 
 
35 Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 1936).  . 
 
36 People v. Shaw, 478 N.E.2d 1142, 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).   
 
19
37 McConico v. State, 458 So.2d 743, 747-48 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). 
38 See generally Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 616 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating in an 
appendix, "an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty"); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 745 n.5 
(1948). 
 
39 358 U.S. 121 (1958). 
 
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 126. 
 
43 Id. at 127. 
 
44 Richard E. Welch III, Elliot D. Lobel, and David S. Nalven, Criminal Liability for Professional 
Partnerships:  Two Perspectives, 38-APR Boston Bar J. 4 (1994). 
 
45 Id.
46 Healy & Palepu, supra note 10.   
 
47 Miller, supra note 6.   
 
48 Flynn McRoberts, Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHIC. TRIB. (September 4, 2002).   
 
49 United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 288-89 (5th Cir. 2004).  The Supreme Court did 
not address this issue in its opinion. 
 
50 Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room vii (2003). 
 
51 Sloan and Hosenball, supra note 11.    
 
52 McLean & Elkind, supra note 49, at 87.   
 
53 Federal Election Commission Disclosure Report, available at http://www.fec.gov
http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/contrib/P00003335.htm
54 Miller, supra note 6. 
 
55 Sloan and Hosenball, supra note 11.    
 
56 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(e). 
 
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Sloan and Hosenball, supra note 11.    
 
60 Michael Hedges, Enron, Andersen Banned from Federal Contracts, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 16, 
2002. 
 
61 Theodore Eisenberg and Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?  An Empirical 
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (July 
2004). 
20
62 Gretchen Morgenson, KPMG Trying to Cut Deal on Liabilities, Filing States, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2005). 
 
63 See Kathryn Kennealy and Kenneth M. Breen, The KPMG Deferred Prosecution:  Warning Flags for 
Defense Rights, 29 CHAMPION 44 (2005). 
 
64 Deborah Solomon, SEC Weighs Big Three World, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005 at C1. 
 
65 David Wighton, The Flawed Logic of Punishing Companies, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 2005 at 19.  
 
66 Id.
67 Joseph A. Grundfest, Over Before It Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005.   
 
68 Id.
69 Id.
